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IntroductIon
Natural gas, after crude oil, is the most important energy carrier in the Ger-
man economy. Over the past twenty years, natural gas has been the only con-
ventional energy carrier to have increased its share in the German energy 
mix. Furthermore, according to consumption forecasts, its significance in 
Germany will grow. Since demand for natural gas has remained high while 
domestic production and imports from Holland have fallen, Germany needs 
to face the challenge of guaranteeing the security of its gas supplies. Given the 
lack of alternative supply routes, the most likely scenario in the medium term 
is increasing gas imports from Russia, which has been the largest supplier of 
gas to Germany since the 1980s. 
This report discusses the issues of gas consumption in Germany and foreign sup-
plies. The author has also examined the possibilities of replacing pipeline gas, 
which predominates at present, with imported liquefied natural gas (LNG) and 
domestic production of biogas and syngas. Most of the statistical data presented 
in this report originates from the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and 
Energy and from Arbeitsgemeinschaft Energiebilanzen, an association of rep-
resentatives of the German energy sector tasked with analysing statistical data 
from the energy sector. The author has also used, among other materials, reports 
and information from the German government and industry organisations. 
This report is divided into three parts. The first one discusses the internal condi-
tions of gas consumption in connection with the implementation of the energy 
transformation strategy. It reveals the Germany industry’s dependence on gas 
supplies. This is particularly true of the chemical industry, which consumes the 
largest amounts of gas as compared to other sectors and which has felt the conse-
quences of the US shale revolution strongest of all. The second part discuses the 
external conditions of gas supply to Germany. This part includes a description 
of natural gas co-operation with Russia and development of gas infrastructure 
in which Russia’s Gazprom has been strongly engaged over the past few years. 
The third and final chapter presents the opportunities for developing alternative 
sources of gas supplies to Germany. It also discusses the issue of liquefied natural 
gas imports to Germany and the construction of an LNG terminal, the use of rich 
shale gas resources in Germany and the opportunities of using biogas and the 
innovative technology known as ‘power-to-gas’.
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theses
1. Natural gas plays a key role in the German economy. After crude oil, it is 
the most important energy carrier used in the country, satisfying around 
20% of Germany’s demand for primary energy. Natural gas is vital for the 
German industry, and is the most important source energy used for heat-
ing buildings. Germany is the largest consumer (84.7 billion m3 in 2014) and 
importer of natural gas in the European Union (96.3 billion m3 in 2014). It is 
also the world’s second largest (after Japan) importer of natural gas. 
2. Natural gas is the most important energy source for the German industry. 
Its share in final energy consumption in the industrial sector in 2014 was 
around 35%. Security of supplies and competitive gas prices are especially 
vital to energy-intensive industries which are competing on international 
markets, such as the metallurgical and chemical industries. From among 
all industries, the chemical industry is the largest consumer of natural gas 
(around 10% of domestic consumption). Over the past few years, this branch 
has experienced strong competitive pressure from North America, where 
gas prices have dropped by around 70% over the past ten years, while in 
Germany this has increased by around 30%. Relatively high gas prices in 
Germany have caused relocation of new investments in the chemical sector 
to the USA. This sector has been putting pressure on the market and the 
government to make gas prices as competitive as possible. 
3. The role of natural gas in electricity production has been reduced dramati-
cally over the past few years, although a complete marginalisation of gas 
power plants in Germany is unlikely. In 2010–2015, the output of gas power 
plants fell by 35%. This was an element of a broader trend existing on the 
German energy market labelled as the ‘Energiewende paradox’: the increase 
in new output from renewable energy sources (RES) leads to more expensive 
low-emission gas power plants losing market share while cheap electricity 
production from coal grows. Given high production costs, the future of gas 
power plants on the German energy market is far from bright. Neverthe-
less, considering the climate policy and the need to maintain stable power 
production, the state will create instruments to enable them to continue 
operation on the market. 
4. The energy transformation strategy (Energiewende) currently being im-
plemented by Germany will strengthen the significance of natural gas in 
the energy sector, even though gas consumption volume will decrease. The 
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strategy envisages a 50% reduction of primary energy consumption by 2050, 
and an 80% reduction in the building heating sector, as well as decreasing 
greenhouse gas emissions by 80–95%. The share of energy from renewable 
sources in primary use is expected to increase from 11.3% in 2014 to 60% 
in 2050. Germany also wants nuclear power production to be eliminated 
by 2022. Given these goals, it will be necessary to lessen the consumption 
of fuels with the highest emission levels: coal and oil. This gap, along with 
renewable energy sources, will be filled by natural gas, which is the purest 
(causing lowest emissions) of the available fossil fuels. Therefore, the share 
of natural gas in the German energy basket will grow. However, considering 
the ever decreasing demand for energy, the volume of its consumption will 
fall. According to most forecasts, gas consumption will have fallen signifi-
cantly by 2050.
5. Natural gas is Germany’s most important heating fuel: 49.3% of households 
in Germany used individual gas heating in 2014. Building and water heating 
accounted for 33% of gas consumption. Natural gas will remain Germany’s 
number one heating fuel until around 2050, by which time the currenti 
mplementation of building thermal insulation strategy will have had tan-
gible effects. The energy transformation strategy is beeing implemented in 
the building heating area above all through reducing the demand for energy 
rather than replacing thermal energy sources with RES. In the long run, 
the issue of demand for thermal energy is expected to be resolved through 
thermal insulation of buildings and by equipping them with heat pumps 
or other renewable energy sources. Strategic documents stipulate that by 
around 2050 almost all building in Germany will be zero-energy buildings, 
and the primary consumption of energy in buildings is expected to fall by 
80% as compared to 2008. 
6. At present, 90% of natural gas consumed in Germany is imported. Three 
suppliers: Russia (36.4 billion m3 in 2014), Norway (30.2 billion m3 in 2014) 
and Holland (26 billion m3 in 2014) account for over 95% of foreign supplies. 
Domestic production and imports from Holland will fall to zero in the 
coming fifteen years, while imports from Russia will grow. Even though 
the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy has declared sup-
port for diversifying gas import sources, for example, by granting import 
guarantees to companies, it has no plans concerning new future sources 
of gas imports as yet. Consistent development of co-operation with the two 
key suppliers, Russia and Norway, is the basis for guaranteeing security 
of gas supplies. 
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7. In the medium term, Russia will strengthen its role as the largest sup-
plier of natural gas to Germany. The share of Russian gas in German im-
ports reached 39% in 2014. Russia has uninterruptedly been Germany’s 
largest gas supplier since the mid 1980s. The construction of the first two 
branches of the Nord Stream gas pipeline in 2005-2012 was a milestone in 
enhancing co-operation between the two countries. The gas pipeline was 
used not only as an instrument to improve Germany’s energy security 
but also as an element of the broader political concept of tightening Rus-
sian-German relations. The decision passed in 2015 to build Nord Stream 
2 proves that co-operation with Russia in the area of gas supplies is being 
reinforced, and the German government politically supports the co-oper-
ation between German corporations and Gazprom. Officially, the govern-
ment agrees with the European Commission that gas supply routes to the 
EU that are alternative to the Russian ones must be built, but Germany 
does not wish to relinquish its position of Russia’s largest partner in oil 
and gas trade. Berlin hopes that gas supply security will be strengthened 
further, owing to the direct gas pipeline connection with Russia and to the 
benefit of being a gas hub in the EU. 
Potential security risks linked to increasing dependence on a single source 
have not affected the government’s political decisions and companies’ in-
vestment strategies. Russia is treated by a majority of the German elite as 
a reliable supplier who supplied gas even when the USSR was collapsing. 
Besides, Germany is connected to the gas grids of the neighbouring coun-
tries so well that possible interruptions in supplies from Russia could be 
compensated with imports from other countries. Furthermore, energy co-
operation with Russia is often viewed as a factor which improves Germa-
ny’s security because it creates mutual dependence which offers Berlin an 
instrument to influence Moscow’s moves. 
8. Germany is among those few highly developed countries, and the only 
economy in the G20 group, not to have an LNG terminal. As a consequence, 
Germany imports only pipeline gas. As a matter of fact the German com-
pany E.ON buys liquefied gas to be supplied to foreign LNG terminals, but 
this gas is sold on foreign markets. Although projects for building LNG 
terminals in the German ports of Wilhelmshaven and Brunsbüttel have 
been prepared, investors have withheld the implementation of these pro-
jects as of yet. According to governmental analyses, developing gas stor-
age facilities is a cheaper solution to ensure security of gas supplies than 
importing LNG or building a terminal in Germany. The large number of 
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gas interconnectors allows German customers to use the terminals in the 
neighbouring countries, above all the terminals in Rotterdam (Holland) 
and Zeebrugge (Belgium). 
9. Theoretically, the utilisation of German shale gas resources offers the larg-
est opportunity to reduce the country’s dependence on imports. Extractable 
shale gas resources are estimated to range between 0.7 and 2.3 trillion m3. 
Shale gas could successfully replace the shrinking imports from Holland 
and domestic conventional gas production. Business and industrial organi-
sations have been lobbying for enabling shale gas extraction, but there is 
very strong political and public resistance to the use of shale gas extraction 
technology in Germany. The Bundestag is currently working on legislation 
amendments that will allow test drilling for shale gas. The bill provides for 
the possibility of using those drilling sites which will have been approved 
by an independent expert commission after 2018. However, large-scale shale 
gas extraction in Germany seems impossible due to strong public resistance 
to this technology. 
10. Increasing domestic biogas production is one alternative to gas imports. 
Germany is already the European Union’s largest biogas producer. Around 
680 million m3 of biomethane (around 0.8% of domestic gas consumption) 
was produced and pumped into the gas grid in 2014. Additionally, 32.6 TWh 
of electric power (around 5% of domestic consumption) and 14 TWh of ther-
mal energy were produced from raw biogas. Back in mid 2014, the govern-
ment’s plans envisaged increasing biomethane production to around 10 bil-
lion m3 annually by 2030, and electricity production at agricultural biogas 
plants were supported by the feed-in-tarrif. However, these plans were re-
vised in the amended RES Act which came into force in August 2014. Due to 
pressure from environmentalist circles and high technology costs, the gov-
ernment reduced the forecasts concerning biomethane production and re-
stricted investments in new biogas plants. In turn, hopes have been pinned 
on the development of the power-to-gas technology (P2G, i.e. transforming 
electric energy into gas fuel). Many German firms, including such giants 
as E.ON, RWE and EnBW, have been testing the possibilities of producing 
hydrogen from electric energy surpluses obtained from RES and transform-
ing hydrogen into syngas which has the same properties as natural gas. At 
present, fourteen pilot installations for producing hydrogen from electricity 
surpluses operate in Germany, and six more are under construction. The 
German government hopes that the P2G technology will make it possible 
to build a zero-emission energy system. Widespread use of this technology 
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would mean that a way to effectively store electric energy has been found, 
the lack of which has been so far the greatest impediment to a rapid imple-
mentation of Energiewende.
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
11
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
8/
20
16
I. the role of natural gas In the german 
economy 
1. Internal conditions on the german gas market 
Germany is the European Union’s largest natural gas consumer, with an an-
nual consumption level of 84.7 billion m3 (data for 2014). Germany is followed 
by the United Kingdom (70.2  billion m3), Italy (56.7 billion m3) and France 
(46.1 billion m3). Germany is also the largest recipient of Russian gas in the EU 
(around 36.4 billion m3) and the second largest recipient of Norwegian gas af-
ter the United Kingdom (around 30 billion m3)1. In 2014, Germany, after Japan, 
was the world’s largest importer of natural gas, its imports volume reaching 
96.3 billion m3. However, if we take into account the share of natural gas in 
primary energy consumption, which is 23% in Germany, this country is close 
to the EU average, which is 23.1%. In this context, natural gas plays a greater 
role in eleven other EU member states, such as Holland (40%), Italy (38%), the 
United Kingdom (33%) and Hungary (35%). 
Until the mid 1970s, natural gas, as with other countries, was of marginal sig-
nificance for the German economy. Until 1964, the share of natural gas in pri-
mary energy consumption in Germany was not higher than 1%, but since the 
mid 1960s, the role of this fuel in Germany has been regularly growing above 
all at the expense of hard coal (see Chart 1). The increase in the significance of 
natural gas since the 1960s was a widespread trend in Western Europe. This 
resulted from the discovery of new gas fields and the search for new energy 
sources with the intention of lessening the dependence on oil imports from 
OPEC countries. In 1975, natural gas accounted for around 14% of primary en-
ergy consumption, and in 1990, the year of the reunification of Germany, for 
around 18%. Natural gas did not play such a sizeable role in the eastern part 
of Germany. Until the end of East Germany’s existence, its energy security re-
lied on domestic brown coal reserves (68% of primary energy consumption in 
1990). However, natural gas also began playing a greater role in its economy 
between 1970 and 1990, and its share in primary energy consumption grew 
from around 1% to around 9%.
1 Energiestudie 2015, BGR, Hanover 2015.
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Chart 1. Primary energy consumption in Western Germany (the old federal 
states) in 1950–1994 in millions of tonnes of coal equivalent  (SKE)
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Data for 2014:
source: AG Energiebilanzen, http://www.ag-energiebilanzen.de/10-0-Auswertungstabellen.html 
Gas consumption increased from the reunification of Germany in 1990 to 2014 
by around 16%, from approximately 72.6 billion m3 (2293 PJ) to approximately 
84.7 billion m3 (2674 PJ). In the year of Germany’s reunification, natural gas, 
with a share of 15.4%, was ranked fourth in terms of primary energy consump-
tion after crude oil (35%), brown coal (21.5%) and hard coal (15.5%). In 2014, nat-
ural gas had already risen to second position (20.4%) after crude oil (34.4%). 
At present, hard coal (13.1%), brown coal (12%) and nuclear energy (8.1%) each 
have a smaller share than in previous years2. 
2 Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, Zahlen Und Fakten Energiedaten, 1 Octo-
ber 2015, http://bmwi.de/DE/Themen/Energie/Energiedaten-und analysen/Energiedaten/
gesamtausgabe,did=476134.html
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Chart 2. Primary energy consumption in Germany in 1990–2014 in PJ 
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Data for 2014:
source: AG Energiebilanzen, http://www.ag-energiebilanzen.de/10-0-Auswertungstabellen.html
The share of natural gas in primary energy consumption increased from 
around 15.4% in 1990 to 20.2% in 2014. It is worth noting that while energy con-
sumption has been gradually falling in general, natural gas consumption has 
remained at the same level (since the period of increase in the 1990s). Over the 
past 24 years, the decrease in energy consumption primarily concerned those 
fuels that are most polluting: petroleum products in road transport and heat-
ing (heating oil) and coal in the power sector. It is only over the past five years 
that natural gas consumption has fallen in the power sector: a decrease of 31% 
from 675 PJ in 2010 to 463 PJ in 2014. Total gas consumption fell by 14% from 
2247 PJ to 1927 PJ during this period. 
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Chart 3. Natural gas consumption in Germany in 1990–2014 in PJ
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source: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, Zahlen Und Fakten Energiedaten, 1 October 
2015, http://bmwi.de/DE/Themen/Energie/Energiedaten-und-analysen/Energiedaten/gesamtausgabe-
,did=476134.html
The household sector, which uses natural gas predominantly for heating, is 
the most important natural gas consumer in Germany (41% in 2014). The sec-
ond largest group of gas consumers is industry (36%). The trade and services 
sector accounts for the remaining consumption (19%). Gas consumption in 
the transport sector is marginal, reaching around 0.5%3, i.e. around 0.25 bil-
lion m3 in 2014.
3 Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, Zahlen Und Fakten Energiedaten, 16 March 
2015, http://bmwi.de/DE/Themen/Energie/Energiedaten-und analysen/Energiedaten/
gesamtausgabe,did=476134.html
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Chart 4. Natural gas consumption in Germany in 2014 broken down into end users 
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source: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, Zahlen Und Fakten Energiedaten, 1 October 
2015, http://bmwi.de/DE/Themen/Energie/Energiedaten-und analysen/Energiedaten/gesamtausgabe-
,did=476134.html
At present, the German system of transport gas pipelines is approximately 
40,000 km long, and the entire gas grid4 has around 505,000 km. The German 
gas distribution market, unlike in many other countries, was not formed by 
the state but as a result of the operation of private gas companies. In effect, 
a relatively large number of actors operate on the German gas market, and 
there is no single national gas corporation. At present, around seventeen op-
erators of distribution networks and around 700 distribution firms operate on 
the German gas distribution market, making it one of the most complex among 
the EU member states5. The gas trade market is diversified to a similar extent. 
Two market platforms operate in Germany: NCG (NetConnectGermany) in the 
southern part and Gaspool in the north of the country. The German gas trans-
port infrastructure is well-developed, owing to which the country can act as 
a gas hub (gas distribution centre) in Central Europe. 
4 See data from the Association of Gas Transmission System Operators (German: Vereinigung 
der Fernleitungsnetzbetreiber Gas e. V. (FNB Gas), http://www.fnb-gas.de/de/fernleitung-
snetze/gastransport/gastransport.html
5 The website of the Association of Gas Transmission System Operators (FNG-Gas), http://
www.fnb-gas.de/de/fernleitungsnetze/gastransport/gastransport.html 
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Chart 5. The development of the gas pipeline network in 1997–2014
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2. Energiewende vs. natural gas
The goal of the German Energy Strategy 2050, the so-called energy trans-
formation (known as Energiewende since 2011) launched in 2010, is to re-
duce the share of energy from fossil fuels in the energy mix and to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. By 2050, greenhouse gas emissions are expect-
ed to fall by 80–95% as compared to 1990, the share of RES in final energy 
consumption is expected to reach 60%, and primary energy consumption 
is to be reduced by 50% as compared to 2008. To achieve these goals, the 
government has made efforts to increase the share of RES in final energy 
consumption and to improve energy efficiency. Most funds allocated for 
RES are invested in systems producing electric and not thermal energy 
(see Chart 6). The consequences for the energy sector include increas-
ing volumes of electricity production from RES which has been replac-
ing electric energy produced by the gradually decommissioned nuclear 
power plants and has been pushing out of the market the most expensive 
electricity produced by gas power plants. The government has not taken 
any decisive steps in the heating and energy efficiency sectors. The heat 
production sector, where natural gas is the predominant fuel, has been 
affected by the energy revolution to a much lesser extent than the power 
sector. While the share of RES in the power sector is expected to rise to 
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40–45% by 20256, the share of RES in the heating sector is only expected to 
reach 14% in 20207. In 2014, renewable energy sources were used to pro-
duce 27.4% of electric energy and 12.2% of thermal energy8. 
Chart 6. Investments in the construction of renewable energy facilities in 
Germany between 2000–2014
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source: Entwicklung der erneuerbaren Energien in Deutschland im Jahr 2015 Grafiken und Diagramme 
unter Verwendung aktueller Daten der Arbeitsgruppe Erneuerbare Energien-Statistik (AGEE-Stat), 
Stand Februar 2016, http://www.erneuerbare-energien.de/EE/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/entwicklung_
der_erneuerbaren_energien_in_deutschland_im_jahr_2015.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=12
It can be expected that natural gas consumption will still decline slower than 
that of coal and oil, and gas’s share in the energy basket will remain rela-
tively high. 
Firstly, there is no political pressure to rapidly reduce natural gas consumption 
because it is the cleanest of the fossil fuels available – with low emission levels 
of both greenhouse gases and air-polluting dust. The goals of the German En-
ergy Strategy to 2050 include an 80–95% reduction in emissions of greenhouse 
6 Renewable Energy Sources Act (German: Gesetz für den Ausbau erneuerbarer Energien, Arti-
cle 1, clause 2. 
7 Renewable Energy Sources in the Heating Sector Act (German: Gesetz zur Förderung Erneu-
erbarer Energien im Wärmebereich, Article 1, clause 2.
8 The Federal Environment Agency, https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/daten/energiebere-
itstellung-verbrauch/anteil-erneuerbarer-energien-am-energieverbrauch 
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gases by 2050 as compared to 1990 and a 50% reduction of primary energy con-
sumption by 2050. Given these goals, it is necessary in the first order to stop 
using the most polluting fuels: brown coal, hard coal and crude oil. 
Secondly, the highest priority is currently given to investments in RES in 
the electricity production sector, where coal is the predominant energy car-
rier and natural gas plays a marginal role. This strategy has been adopted for 
a number of reasons. The most important being public support for decommis-
sioning nuclear and coal power plants and replacing them with RES. Further-
more, the German government, by supporting RES, wants to support German 
manufacturers from the electric power engineering sector. Germany aspires 
to becoming a powerful player in the area of using renewable energy sourc-
es for electricity production, which offers the greatest opportunities for ex-
pansion to foreign markets. This is one of the reasons why renewable energy 
sources receive greater support in the electric energy sector than in the ther-
mal energy sector. 
Thirdly, modernisation of the heating sector takes much more time and causes 
more problems of an administrative nature than modernisation of the electric 
energy sector. The heating sector will be modernised above all through thermal 
insulation of buildings and by reducing the demand for energy. The National 
Action Plan on Energy Efficiency9 specifies that by 2050 almost all buildings 
in Germany will have energy consumption levels close to zero10, i.e. they will 
use as much energy as they produce themselves. Primary energy consumption 
by buildings is to be cut by 80% by 2050 as compared to 2008. The government 
announced in December 2014 that one billion euros would be allocated for sup-
porting thermal insulation of buildings from the federal budget in 2015–2019, 
and the pool of cheap loans would be increased to two billion euros annually11.
It is assumed in most available energy consumption forecasts that, if Ener-
giewende goals are achieved by 2050, gas consumption will be reduced by at 
9 Energieeffizienzstrategie Gebäude Wege zu einem nahezu klimaneutralen Gebäudebe-
stand 2015, Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, http://www.bmwi.de/BM-
Wi/Redaktion/PDF/E/energieeffizienzstrategie-gebaeude,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012, 
sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf
10 According to Directive 2010/31/EU of 19 May 2010 on the energy performance of buildings.
11 Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, Gabriel: Wir systematisieren die Ener-
giewende und machen Energieeffizienz zur zweiten Säule, 3 December 2014, http://www.
bmwi.de/DE/Themen/Energie/energiewende,did=672914.html 
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
19
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 0
8/
20
16
least half or will be eliminated entirely12. According to alternative forecasts, 
gas consumption levels will remain relatively high, ranging from 1300 to 
2000 PJ in 2050 (analyses of research institutes Prognos AG, GWS and Köln 
University13), and will even rise to 3300 PJ in 2040 (ExxonMobil14). However, 
taking into account the way in which energy transformation has been imple-
mented and the pace of technological progress in the area of RES, it should be 
assumed that gas consumption in Germany will fall in the longer term. 
3. natural gas in the heating and power sectors 
Natural gas is Germany’s main heating fuel. In 2014, 49.3% of German house-
holds used individual gas heating, while heating oil was the second most pop-
ular heating energy carrier (26.8%). 13.5% of households bought energy from 
heating networks (42% of the network heat was generated by natural gas, 
25% by hard coal and 15% by waste15). Natural gas is used so widely because it 
is a practical, clean and widespread way of heating buildings. Heating oil is 
poorly regarded in Germany and is not a preferred choice in newly constructed 
buildings, which is proven by statistics concerning the heating of new build-
ings – heating oil systems were installed in less than 0.5% of new houses in 
2014. Gas heating systems are still the most popular in newly built houses – in 
2014, 49.8% of new buildings had gas heating systems, 21.5% were connected 
to the heating network, 19.9% used electric heat pumps, and 6.1% used solid 
biomass furnaces16.
12 Geschäftsmodell Energiewende Eine Antwort auf das „Die-Kosten-derEnergiewende”-Argu-
ment, Fraunhofer-Institut für Windenergie und Energiesystemtechnik, IWES, Kassel, Janu-
ary 2014, page 21, https://www.energie.fraunhofer.de/de/bildmaterial/news-pdf/studie-ge-
schaeftsmodell-energiewende.pdf (accessed on 15 Januar 2016), see page 21.
13 Entwicklung der Energiemärkte – Energiereferenzprognose Projekt Nr. 57/12, Studie im 
Auftrag des Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft und Technologie, Prognos AG, EWI – Ener-
giewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universität zu Köln, GWS – Gesellschaft für wirtschaftli-
che Strukturforschung, June 2014, pages 529-530, http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/
PDF/Publikationen/entwicklung-der-energiemaerkte-energiereferenzprognose-endbericht, 
property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf (accessed on 15 January 2016).
14 ExxonMobil’s Energy Forecast, http://www.exxonmobil-energieportal.de/energieprognose/
primaerenergieverbrauch/ (accessed on 15 January 2016).
15 The Federal Statistical Office, Wärmeversorgung 2014: Abgegebene Wärme menge um 11,3% 
gesunken, 4 December 2015, https://www.destatis.de/DE/PresseService/Presse/Pressemit-
teilungen/2015/12/PD15_447_434.html;jsessionid=199E7E513EAD043571D2D9723AE2375F.cae1 
16 AG Energiebilanzen e.V., Energieverbrauch in Deutschland Daten für das 1. – 4. Quartal 2015, 
http://www.ag-energiebilanzen.de/ 
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Natural gas will remain the key heating fuel in Germany in the long term. 
Water and building heating accounts for around 33% of final energy con-
sumption in Germany. Differences in gas consumption resulting from the 
temperature outside are significant. In the winter season, gas consumption 
in Germany exceeds 100 billion kWh monthly (around 10.2 billion m3), and 
in summer, it reaches around 50 billion kWh monthly (around 5.1 billion m3). 
This consumption profile causes development of storage facilities, whose 
capacity is growing on a regular basis – it increased from 14.1 billion m3 in 
1998 to 24.6 billion m3 in 201517. 
Chart 7. German household heating structure in 1995–2014
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source: Energieverbrauch in Deutschland Daten für das 1.- 4. Quartal 2015, AG Energiebilanzen, http://
www.ag-energiebilanzen.de/
17 The German Association of Energy and Water Industries BDEW, Entwicklungen in der 
deutschen Erdgaswirtschaft 1. Halbjahr 2015, Berlin, June 2015, http://www.ag-energiebi-
lanzen.de/index.php?article_id=29&fileName=erdgas_hj_2015.pdf (accessed on 15 January 
2016).
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Chart 8. New houses’ heating structure
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Gas consumption reached around 10.3 billion m3 in the electric energy sector 
in 2015. However, gas power plants have become less and less profitable over 
the past few years, and therefore gas consumption has been rapidly falling 
in electricity production. This has been one of the unplanned consequences 
of the government’s energy policy aimed at supporting RES. This trend is 
a result of the so-called ‘energy transformation paradox’18. This phenomenon 
means that as production of electric energy from RES grows, more electricity 
is produced by coal power plants, and carbon dioxide emissions grow instead 
of falling. In 2010–2015, production of electric energy from RES increased by 
around 85%, from 105 billion kWh to 194 billion kWh, and at the same time 
the output of gas power plants dropped by 37% and that of nuclear power 
plants by 35%. At the same time, brown coal power plants increased their 
output by around 6% and hard coal power plants by around 1%. The German 
government views this as a disturbing phenomenon because one of the main 
goals of the energy policy branded as energy transformation was to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by increasing the output of wind and solar power 
plants and using gas power plants to supplement electricity production from 
18 German: Energiewende-Paradox; see: Das deutsche Energiewende Paradox: Ursachen und 
Herausforderungen, Agora Energiewende, Berlin 2014, http://www.agora-energiewende.de/
fileadmin/downloads/publikationen/Analysen/Trends_im_deutschen_Stromsektor/Ana-
lyse_Energiewende_Paradox_web.pdf
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renewable sources, which are characterised by fluctuations in the output, 
depending on weather conditions. 
To counteract this trend and reach the greenhouse gas emission goals, the gov-
ernment has decided to intervene and withdraw from the market the oldest 
brown coal power plants with a capacity of 2.7 GW (13% of the capacity of Ger-
man brown coal power plants) and to shift them to the so-called power reserve. 
This means that these power plants will be put into operation only in case of 
power shortages in the system, and they will be decommissioned and liquidat-
ed after four years. The costs of this operation will reach around 0.5–1 billion 
euros annually in 2015–2020, and they will be paid by electricity consumers19. 
However, it is uncertain whether and when gas power plants will be compet-
itive again on the German market. At present, the low price of coal coupled 
with relatively low prices of CO2 emission permits makes coal power plants the 
most profitable. According to data from Agora Energiewende think tank in 2015, 
production costs at gas power plants (38.8 euro/kWh) were around 20% higher 
than those of hard coal power plants (31.5 euro/kWh) and around 60% higher 
than at brown coal power plants (15.2 euro/kWh)20. 
Chart 9. Marginal costs of electric energy production
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source: Die Energiewende im Stromsektor: Stand der Dinge 2015, Agora Energiewende, Berlin 2016, page 
27, http://www.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2016/Jahresauswertung_2016/Agora_Jahre-
sauswertung_2015_web.pdf
19 Rafał Bajczuk, The uncertain future of the coal energy industry in Germany, OSW Commen-
tary, 20 October 2015, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2015-10-20/
uncertain-future-coal-energy-industry-germany
20 ‘Die Energiewende im Stromsektor: Stand der Dinge 2015’, Agora Energiewende, Berlin 2016, 
page 27, http://www.agora-energiewende.de/fileadmin/Projekte/2016/Jahresauswer-
tung_2016/Agora_Jahresauswertung_2015_web.pdf (accessed on 15 January 2016).
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The gas power plant Irsching 5 in Bavaria has become a symbol of the problems 
German gas power plants are experiencing. Its construction was completed in 
2010, and it is Germany’s most modern gas power plant so far, its efficiency 
being 59.7%. However, given the competition from RES, which receive prefer-
ential treatment, and cheap coal power plants, it did not produce any electric-
ity to be sold on the market in 2014 and 2015, and its output was only used to 
stabilise the network. For this reason, its operator, E.ON, has announced that 
the power plant will be withdrawn from use in 201621. 
Considering the current trends, it seems that gas power plants have no chance 
of development on the German energy market. Electricity from natural gas 
will remain uncompetitive in the coming years, and power plant operators will 
make efforts to keep them on the threshold of profitability. To counteract this, 
the government amended the Combined Heat and Power Plant Act in Decem-
ber 2015 which provides for increasing subsidies for gas powered systems. In 
the medium term, the increase in emission permit prices and falling gas prices 
will help gas power plants continue operation on the German market. 
The authors of the forecast for the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and 
Energy concerning the development of energy markets compared a dozen or so 
of various analyses concerning the future of the German energy market. De-
pending on the analysis, it is predicted that between 38% (ExxonMobil’s fore-
cast) and 5% of electric energy (forecast from the government’s representative 
for the environment) will be produced by gas power plants in 204022.
21 E.ON’s press information, Keine wirtschaftliche Perspektive: Eigentümer der Gaskraft-
werke Irsching 4 und 5 zeigen Stilllegung an, 30 March 2015, http://www.eon.com/de/
presse/pressemitteilungen/pressemitteilungen/2015/3/30/no-economic-prospects-own-
ers-of-the-irsching-4-and-5-gas-fired-power-stations-announce-their-closure.html
22 Entwicklung der Energiemärkte – Energiereferenzprognose Projekt Nr. 57/12, Studie im 
Auftrag des Bundesministeriums für Wirtschaft und Technologie, Prognos AG, EWI – Ener-
giewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universität zu Köln, GWS – Gesellschaft für wirtschaftli-
che Strukturforschung, June 2014, pages 529–530, http://www.bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/
PDF/Publikationen/entwicklung-der-energiemaerkte-energiereferenzprognose-endberic
ht,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf 
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Chart 10. Gas consumption in electricity production in PJ
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source: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, Zahlen Und Fakten Energiedaten, 1 October 
2015, http://bmwi.de/DE/Themen/Energie/Energiedaten-und%20analysen/Energiedaten/gesamtausga-
be,did=476134.html 
4. the importance of natural gas for industry
The German industrial sector treats natural gas as the most important source 
of electric and thermal energy and feedstock in chemical processes. Its primary 
advantages include the ability to be used flexibly and the low level of pollution 
and greenhouse gas emissions. In 2014, the German industrial sector accounted 
for around 40% of final gas consumption (760.3 PJ). The key consumers were: the 
chemical (10% of domestic consumption), food (6%) and paper (4%) industries. 
The price and availability of natural gas are most important to the chemical, 
pharmaceutical and metallurgical industries, where raw material prices affect 
the final product price to the greatest extent. The risk of relocating German 
chemical plants to the USA due to competitive gas prices there has been given 
a lot of publicity over the past few years. Germany is the world’s largest export-
er of chemical products. In 2013, natural gas, after crude oil, was the second 
most important production raw material in the chemical industry (crude oil 
74%, natural gas 11%) and the most important energy source (36% of demand for 
energy from natural gas)23. Representatives of the chemical industry say that if 
23 In 2013, the chemical industry consumed 20 million tonnes of raw materials for the needs of 
organic chemistry: 74% are petroleum products, 11% natural gas, 13% renewable raw materi-
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oil prices increased permanently, natural gas could replace crude oil as a pro-
duction raw material and increase its share in the raw material basket of the 
German chemical industry24. However, given the falling oil prices, a reverse 
trend has been observed over the past few years. 
The imbalance of the gas prices between the USA and Europe is currently the 
largest problem for the German chemical industry. Gas prices in the European 
Union and the USA were very similar (the price was slightly lower in Europe) 
until as recently as 2005, but since then gas prices in the USA have fallen sig-
nificantly. An unprecedented increase in shale gas extraction has caused gas 
prices in the USA to be among the lowest in the world, and are around 65% 
lower than in Europe. According to BP’s data, in 2014, the natural gas averaged 
price in Germany was higher (US$9.11/million Btu) than the averaged price in 
the United Kingdom (US$8.22/million Btu), the USA (US$4.35/million Btu) and 
Canada (US$3.87/million Btu)25. 
Chart 11. Global natural gas prices in 2000–2015
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source: World Bank, Commodity Markets, http://www.worldbank.org/en/research/commodity-markets
als (including cellulose, sugar, starch, vegetable and animal fats), 2% coal. Energy needs were 
satisfied in 36% by natural gas, 33% by electricity and 12% by network heat. Source : H. Bardt, 
Fossile Rohstoffe der Chemischen Industrie, Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln, Köln, 
2 September 2013, http://www.iwkoeln.de/studien/gutachten/beitrag/hubertus-bardt-fossile-
rohstoffe-der-chemischen-industrie-128289; Verband der Chemischen Industrie e.V., Rohst-
offbasis der chemischen Industrie, 30 November 2015, https://www.vci.de/vci/downloads-vci/
top-thema/daten-fakten-rohstoffbasis-der-chemischen-industrie-de.pdf
24 S. Hofmann, Chemiebranche such nach Ölersatz, Handelsblatt, 14 January 2010.
25 www.bp.com, http://tools.bp.com/energy-charting-tool.aspx#/ep/natural_gas_prices/
unit2/$-mBtu/view/line/ 
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This imbalance in gas prices affects German companies’ investment decisions. 
In 2015, German chemical companies’ foreign investments grew six times fast-
er than their domestic investments. Furthermore, considering low oil and gas 
prices, chemical production in the USA is currently four times more profitable 
than in Europe26. Whereas as recently as in 2011, German companies’ domestic 
investments were almost equal to foreign ones. Analysts from Euler Hermes 
predict that this trend will strengthen in 2016 – German chemical sectors’ do-
mestic investments are expected to increase by 1% and foreign investments 
by 9%. The United States benefits most from these investments. In 2015, Ger-
many’s largest chemical corporation, BASF, informed of the launch of an in-
vestment in an ammonia factory worth around US$600 million in Freeport, 
Texas. It is also considering an investment worth double the value in a propyl-
ene factory27.
One solution to resolve the issue of the chemical industry’s dependence on nat-
ural gas would be, on the one hand, introducing cheaper substitutes of this 
fuel and diversifying supply sources, and on the other, moving production to 
North America, where gas prices are currently the lowest in the world. Given 
this situation, the German Chemical Industry Association is lobbying for the 
launch of shale gas extraction in Germany even though the vast majority of the 
German public oppose this28. In the opinion of representatives of the chemical 
industry, increasing the share of renewable resources might only partly solve 
the problem. Considering the limited surfaces of cultivated areas and compe-
tition from the energy sector (biogas and biofuels), neither Germany nor the 
European Union are capable of satisfying the chemical industry’s demand for 
renewable raw materials relying solely on their own production. Therefore, 
under hypothetical conditions of an economy based on renewable raw materi-
als, the raw materials would be supplied to the chemical industry from South 
America and Asia. 
26 Euler Hermes Studie: Konkurrenz Wächst – Deutsche Chemiebranche Investiert im Ausland, 
30 June 2015, http://www.eulerhermes.de/mediacenter/neuigkeiten/Pages/euler-hermes-
studie-deutsche-chemiebranche.aspx
27 BASF, https://www.basf.com/de/company/news-and-media/news-releases/2015/03/p-15-176.
html, https://www.basf.com/documents/corp/de/news-and-media/news-releases/2015/07/
P300_BASF_Yara_Ammoniakanlage.pdf
28 The German Chemical Industry Association (German: Verband Chemischer Industrie), https://
www.vci.de/themen/energie-klima-rohstoffe/energiepolitik/vci-positionspapier-zur-erd-
gasfoerderung-in-deutschland-chancen-von-schiefergas-nutzen.jsp 
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II. guaranteeIng gas supplIes to germany 
1. foreign gas supplies vs. domestic production
In 2014, the share of imported natural gas in domestic consumption reached 
87.1%. The largest suppliers were: Russia (34.2%), Norway (28.4%) and Holland 
(24.5%). The remaining suppliers, i.e. Denmark and the United Kingdom, were 
of marginal significance (3.5%). Domestic production reached 10.7 billion m3 
and satisfied 9.5% of consumption. In 2014, domestic users consumed 84.7 bil-
lion m3, and 21.4 billion m3 was re-exported out of 106.4 billion m3 of natural gas 
used in Germany. Dependence on imports from the two main suppliers, Russia 
and Norway, will strengthen in the future. This is due to the fact that imports 
from Holland and domestic gas production – the sources which have so far bal-
anced out the supplies from Russia and Norway – will have been exhausted in 
the coming years. According to forecasts published in 2015, at the present level 
of output conventional gas fields in Germany can continue production for eight 
more years. It needs to be noted that Germany imports only gas supplied via 
pipelines. The country has no LNG terminal and is not planning to build any 
at present. 
Table 1. Origin of natural gas in Germany in 2012–2013
origin 2012  (billion m3) %
2013  
(billion m3) %
2014  
(billion m3) %
Russia 37.0 34.0 37.9 34.1 36.4 34.2
Holland 24.8 22.8 29.4 26.4 26 24.5
Norway 32.5 29.8 27.7 25.0 30.2 28.4
Other 2.9 2.7 5.4 4.8 3.7 3.5
Domestic 
production
11.7 10.8 10.7 9.6 10.1 9.5
Gross 
consumption
108.8 100 111.0 100 106.4 100
Re-export 19.7 18.1 20.9 18.8 21.4 20.1
Gas in storage 
facilities
0.2 0.2 0.9 0.8 -0.3 -0.3
Consumption 89.3 82.0 91.0 82 84.7 79.6
source: Energiestudie 2015 – Reserven, Ressourcen und Verfügbarkeit von Energierohstoffen, Hanover 
2015, http://www.bgr.bund.de/DE/Themen/Energie/Produkte/energiestudie2014_Zusammenfassung.
html?nn=1542230
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Russia has been the largest natural gas supplier to Germany since as far back as 
the mid 1980s (see Appendix). Norway is the second most important supplier. 
In 1994, it outpaced Holland, which is now the third most important supplier. 
Apart from these three major sources, natural gas is also imported to Germany 
from the United Kingdom and Denmark. 
Chart 12. Germany’s natural gas supply broken down into sources of origin in 
1991–2014 in PJ
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source: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, Zahlen Und Fakten Energiedaten, 1 October 
2015, http://bmwi.de/DE/Themen/Energie/Energiedaten-und analysen/Energiedaten/gesamtausgabe-
,did=476134.html
Domestic production plays a decreasing role in gas consumption structure. 
Both the share of natural gas from domestic production and the production vol-
ume are several times lower than in the 1990s. Domestic production of natural 
gas reached its peak in 1999, the output being 747.1 PJ (around 24.7 billion m3). 
In 2014, the output fell to 323.3 PJ (around 10.7 billion m3), reaching the lowest 
level in reunited Germany’s history. At present, 90% of domestically produced 
gas originates from Lower Saxony. In addition to this, rich gas fields are also 
located in Schleswig-Holstein. 99% of natural gas in Germany is produced by 
five firms29: BEB Erdgas und Erdöl GmbH & Co. KG (3.474 billion m3), Mobil Erd-
gas-Erdöl GmbH (2.778 billion m3), DEA Detusche Erdöl GmbH (1.504 billion m3), 
29 Energiestudie 2015, Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources, Hanover 2015, 
page 21.
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Wintershall Holding AG (0.622 billion m3) and GDF Suez E&P Deutschland 
GmbH (0.620 billion m3).
German gas producers attach much more significance to production abroad 
(in Russia, North-Western Europe, North Africa and South America) than to 
domestic production. In 2014, production abroad reached around 24.4 billion 
m3 and was 4.6% higher than a year before. The largest gas producers were 
Wintershall AG and E.ON30. Wintershall AG is Germany’s largest producer of 
natural gas and crude oil. The company operates worldwide: it is the largest 
gas producer in Holland, and also extracts gas in the North Sea, Argentina and 
Russia. In 2014, the company’s foreign natural gas output reached around 15.13 
billion m3. Germany’s second most important natural gas producer abroad was 
E.ON. In 2014, its foreign output reached 7.82 billion m3, including around 75% 
from the Russian Yuzhno-Russkoye field in which the company holds a stake31.
It is worth emphasising that German firms have been withdrawing from nat-
ural gas production abroad. Germany’s largest energy companies, E.ON and 
RWE, operating in oil, gas and electric energy sectors in 2015 sold a major part 
of their portfolio in the area of oil and gas production. In March 2015, the in-
vestment fund Letter One bought Dea, a company which extracts oil and gas 
in the North Sea and in Germany, from RWE for 5.1 billion euros. The same 
investor bought gas fields in Norway from E.ON in October 2015. The fund is 
controlled by Mikhail Fridman, the owner of one of Russia’s largest investment 
funds, Alfa Group32. In January 2015, E.ON also sold its subsidiary producing oil 
and gas in the United Kingdom to the British company Premier Oil. The main 
reason why German investors sell oil and gas production companies are their 
financial problems caused by sudden changes on the German energy market 
resulting from the implementation of the energy transformation strategy and 
falling demand for energy due to the economic crisis in the EU. 
Another source of foreign gas supplies is purchasing directly from the produc-
er. Long-term contracts where gas prices are indexed to oil prices have been 
the predominant form of gas purchase in Germany throughout history. Such 
contracts are increasingly rare and are mainly used in contacts with Russia’s 
30 Energiestudie 2015, op. cit., page 22.
31 Energiestudie 2015, Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources, Hanover 2015, 
page 22
32 Konrad Popławski, E.ON sprzeda swoje udziały w norweskich złożach, OSW Analyses, 14 Oc-
tober 2015.
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Gazprom, although price formulas can be renegotiated more and more often33. 
Gazprom has concluded the most important long-term contracts covering gas 
supplies to Germany with the following German companies: E.ON (four con-
tracts until 2035), Wingas (one contract until 2030) and VNG (one contract un-
til 2030).
Since the late 1990s, medium-term contracts where the price is set on the basis 
of gas prices on the largest energy exchanges (so-called hub-indexation) have 
been ever more frequently used since the late 1990s. Norway’s Statoil applies 
partial or complete hub-indexation to all its German clients. The latest way 
of buying foreign gas is through futures and spot contracts on gas exchanges. 
This form is becoming increasingly popular among German gas firms; for ex-
ample, the German company VNG in 2013 acquired around 70% of gas under 
futures and spot contracts, and only 30% under long-term contracts34.
2. history of co-operation with holland and norway
Historically, Holland was the first supplier of natural gas to Germany. It 
took only four years from locating Groningen, Europe’s largest gas field in 
northern Holland, in 1959, for Holland’s Gasunie to launch its first supplies 
in 1963. Holland was the sole supplier of natural gas to Germany for the next 
ten years. The Trans-Europa-Naturgas-Pipeline (TENP), a gas pipeline con-
necting the Dutch gas network with Switzerland and Italy via western Ger-
many was put into operation in 1974. At present, the pipeline, with an annual 
transport capacity of 15.5 billion m3, is used to transport Norwegian and Brit-
ish natural gas from the gasfields in the North Sea. In 1977, Holland exported 
to Germany 24.36 billion m3 of natural gas, and this was the largest volume 
of gas this country has ever supplied to its western neighbour. Later on, Hol-
land lost the position of Germany’s largest supplier of natural gas, first to 
Russia (1984) and then to Norway (1999)35. At present, exports to Germany are 
33 In July 2012, E.ON and Gazprom signed a retrospective contract valid from 2010 amend-
ing the conditions of the gas purchase contract. The new contract provides for withdraw-
al from 100% indexation of gas prices to oil prices, Source: E.ON’s press release of 3 July 
2012 titled E.ON erzielt Einigung bei langfristigen Gaslieferverträgen mit Gazprom und hebt 
Konzernausblick für das Jahr 2012 an, https://www.eon.com/de/presse/pressemitteilungen/
pressemitteilungen/2012/7/3/e-on-erzielt-einigung-bei-langfristigen-gasliefervertraegen-
mit-0.html 
34 VNG, Annual report 2013, page 16.
35 Source: Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA), Entwicklung der 
Erdgaseinfuhr in die Bundesrepublik Deutschland Bilanzen 1998–2014 Grafik, http://www.
bafa.de/bafa/de/energie/erdgas/ausgewaehlte_statistiken/egashist.pdf 
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in the final phase because Dutch gas fields will soon be exhausted. The Fed-
eral Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur) is planning that Dutch gas supplies 
to Germany will end in 202936. It should be noted that Dutch gas has a lower 
energy value than Russian and Norwegian gas, and therefore it cannot be 
mixed in a single gas network. L-gas (low calorific gas) produced in Germany 
and Holland has a methane content ranging from 80% to 87% and is avail-
able to recipients in north-western Germany, while H-gas (high calorific gas), 
with methane content ranging from 87% to 99%, is distributed in the rest 
of Germany. Since Dutch and German gas fields are running dry, Germany 
launched the process of switching from L-gas to H-gas in 2015. At present, 
around 4.3 million consumers are connected to L-gas in north-western Ger-
many. This change means above all the need to rebuild network equipment 
and simultaneous replacement or reconstruction of the devices using gas so 
that they can operate on high calorific gas. For Germany this means the need 
to increase gas imports from its two largest suppliers, Russia and Norway, or 
to look for other sources of natural gas. 
Gas from Norway began to be supplied in 1977. Initially, it was transported from 
the Norwegian field Ekofisk to the collection point in Emden via the Norpipe 
gas pipeline. Since then, Norway has regularly launched production on subse-
quent fields (Statfjord, Heimdal, Gullfaks, Troll), which has been accompanied 
by the development of new gas pipelines. Towards the end of the 1980’s, the 
chemical corporation BASF negotiated building a gas pipeline running from 
Emden to its chemical production site in Ludwigshafen in central Germany. 
However, due to pressure from Ruhrgas, the main recipient of Norwegian gas 
in Germany, the Norwegian partners chose not to begin this co-operation. This 
was an element of the so-called ‘gas war’ between BASF and Ruhrgas, which 
ended up with BASF’s engagement in building gas pipelines running east-
wards and co-operation with Russia’s Gazprom after the Iron Curtain fell37. 
The Europipe I and Europipe II pipelines which run to Dornum, 40 km to the 
north-east from Emden were put into operation in 1995 and 1999, respectively. 
Norway’s Statoil invested in these pipelines. At present, Norwegian and British 
gas from the North Sea is also transported to Germany via Dutch and Belgian 
gas pipelines. It is estimated that Norwegian natural gas reserves will run out 
36 Federal Network Agency, Umstellung von L- auf H-Gas (Marktraumumstellung), http://
www.bundesnetzagentur.de/DE/Sachgebiete/ElektrizitaetundGas/Verbraucher/Netzan-
schlussUndMessung/UmstellungGasbeschaffenheit/UmstellungGasqualitaet-node.html 
37 U. Leuschner, Die deutsche Gasversorgung von den Anfangen bis 1998, 2008, page 34, http://
www.udo-leuschner.de/pdf/gasversorgung.pdf 
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around 203038. Co-operation with Norway covering natural gas, crude oil and, 
in the near future, electric energy39 is very important to Berlin. The two coun-
tries co-operate as part of Energy Partnership, i.e. a deep and comprehensive 
co-operation formula in the area of energy40. Oil and gas account for 80% of the 
value of Norwegian exports to Germany. This dependence is mutual as regards 
gas: around 30% of gas supplies to Germany originate from Norway, and the 
share of German gas in Norwegian gas imports also reaches around 30%. Work 
on building an electricity link between the two countries is underway. It is 
planned to be put into operation in 2020. 
3. history of gas co-operation with russia
At present, Russia is Germany’s most important energy partner. In 1973, the 
USSR became the second (after Holland) largest supplier of natural gas to Ger-
many. Major reasons for beginning co-operation with Moscow included the 
need to diversify supplies and subsequently the search for alternative sources 
of energy following the oil crises in 1973 and 1979. On the one hand, the then 
SPD–FDP coalition government led by Chancellor Willy Brandt treated the 
‘pipes for gas’ deal of 1970 as a response to the need to diversify energy sources 
in Germany, and on the other hand treated it as an instrument for further nor-
malisation of relations with the Soviet Union. Thus, gas co-operation between 
Germany and Russia has carried a political overtone since the very beginning, 
and this tradition of dual-track co-operation (trade and politics) is an essential 
element of German foreign policy. 
Germany and the USSR signed the first three contracts in 1970: the first one 
signed by Ruhrgas AG (the predecessor of E.ON) provided for supplying 3 bil-
lion m3 of natural gas annually for twenty years, the second contract signed 
by Mannesmann Export GmbH concerned the sale of pipes for gas pipeline 
38 In 2009, the estimated volume of Norwegian natural gas reserves was 2046 billion m3, see: 
Norway 2011, International Energy Agency, http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublica-
tions/publication/Norway2011_web.pdf 
39 Rafał Bajczuk, Nowe połączenie energetyczne Niemiec z Norwegią, OSW Analyses, 18 Febru-
ary 2015, http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2015-02-18/nowe-polaczenie-ener-
getyczne-niemiec-z-norwegia 
40 The energy partnership is intended at maintaining market-oriented conditions of co-oper-
ation in the area of energy and promoting German RES technologies and energy efficiency. 
At present, Germany co-operates as part of energy partnership with Norway, Russia, Bra-
zil, China, India, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia and Turkey. Source: Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Aussenpolitik/GlobaleFragen/Ener-
gie/Energiepartnerschaften_node.html
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construction (the USSR did not have the necessary technology at that time), 
and the third one concerned financing. Gas supplies were launched in 1973. The 
co-operation turned out to be so effective that two more gas supply contracts 
were signed in the next four years. Another contract, signed in 1980, provided 
for increasing supplies to 20 billion m3 annually for 25 years. The only export 
route to Western Europe available at that time was the Bratstvo gas pipeline 
running through the Ukrainian SSR and Czechoslovakia. In 1975, Germany’s 
Ruhrgas and France’s GDF commenced the construction of the MEGAL (Ger-
man: Mittel-Europäische-Gasleitung) transit gas pipeline connecting France 
with the Soviet gas pipeline system. The connection, which had an annual ca-
pacity of 22 billion m3, was put into operation in 1980. The development of co-
operation with the USSR was disrupted for a while due to the embargo imposed 
by Western countries on trade in components for gas production and trans-
port in 1981. The embargo was lifted in 1982 following diplomatic efforts from 
France, Germany and the United Kingdom. By 1989, the Soviet Union’s share in 
gas supplies to Germany grew to 30%.
In the Cold War period, gas imports from the USSR were of major economic 
significance to Germany. Firstly, Eastern gas was cheaper than alternative 
supplies from Norway, Libya or Algeria, and secondly, it strengthened the 
market position of the German company Ruhrgas41. Markus Wörz, a Ger-
man expert, claims that gas supplies from the Soviet Union to Germany 
during the Cold War period strengthened bilateral relations, and gas co-
operation served as a foundation for developing political relations42. Ex-
perience in contacts with the USSR during the Cold War period has had 
a major impact on the development of relations between reunited Germany 
and Russia. The German political and economic elites supported enhancing 
economic and political co-operation with Russia from the turn of the cen-
tury43, arguing that it positively affected the oil and gas sector at the time 
of the Cold War. This point of view gradually changed as a consequence of 
the Russian-Ukrainian gas conflicts in 2005–2006 and 2007–2009 and the 
Russian-Georgian conflict in 2008. Arguments concering threats posed by 
41 P. Högselius, Red Gas, New York, 2013, page 225.
42 M. Wörz, 10 Minuten Energieaußenpolitik: Zentrale Herausforderungen, in T. Kästner, 
A. Kießling, G. Riemer, energie in 60 Minuten, Wiesbaden 2011, page 106.
43 A. Kwiatkowska-Drożdż, Germany on Russia. Yes to links, no to rapprochement, OSW Point 
of View, Warsaw 2013, pages 10-25, http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/pw_39_ger-
many_on_russia_net_0.pdf 
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Germany’s dependence on gas imports from Russia began to be raised in 
debate more and more frequently44. 
The state-controlled company Gazprom was created in Russia in 1989. Its main 
objectives included expansion to Western markets and co-operation with 
Western companies. Russia treated Germany as a bridgehead during its ex-
pansion to Western Europe. Gazprom’s strategic goal was to acquire shares at 
each level of gas trade: transport, storage and direct sale. In 1990, Gazprom 
signed a co-operation agreement with Germany’s Wintershall, a subsidiary of 
the chemical corporation BASF, tasked with oil and gas production and trade. 
As part of their co-operation, the two corporations established two joint ven-
tures: Wingas (gas transport and distribution) and WIEH (gas trade) in 1993. 
Wintershall became the majority shareholder (65% stake). Wingas financed 
most investments in German gas transport and storage infrastructure in the 
1990s, including the JAGAL gas pipeline, being a section of the Yamal-Europe 
gas pipeline and the first alternative to the Ukrainian route for Russian gas 
transport to Europe and Germany. Then, at the onset of gas market liberali-
sation, Gazprom’s activity in Germany was perceived positively. The German 
Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy supported Gazprom’s co-
operation with Wintershall, since competition to the then monopoly, Ruhrgas, 
was thus created, and cheap gas was offered to clients in Germany45. In 1993, 
Wingas put into operation three projects of key significance for the security of 
gas supplies: 
•	 the STEGAL (German: Sachsen-Thüringen-Erdgas-Anbindungsleitung) 
gas pipeline connecting the Czech gas pipeline system with the MIDAL gas 
pipeline in central Germany;
•	 the MIDAL (German: Mitte-Deutschland-Anbindungsleitung) gas pipeline 
connecting the Dutch gas pipeline system with central Germany and the 
gas storage facility in Rehden; 
•	 the gas storage facility in Rehden, its capacity being 4 billion m3; the largest 
gas storage facility in Western Europe.
44 S. Kaufmann, Es gibt noch keine Alternative zu russischem Gas, Handelsblatt, 12 March 2014, 
http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/international/deutschlands-abhaengigkeit-es-gibt-
noch-keine-alternative-zu-russischem-gas/9605486.html (accessed on 20 January 2015).
45 J. Grätz, Ziemlich beste Freunde. Das Auf und Ab der Partner Wintershall – Gazprom, in: Os-
teuropa no. 63/7, July 2013, page 83. 
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Another of Wingas’s important projects was putting into operation the WEDAL 
(German: Westdeutschland Anbindungsleitung) gas pipeline connecting the 
Belgian transport system with the MIDAL gas pipeline in central Germany in 
1998. The simultaneous launch of the Interconnector gas pipeline connecting 
Bacton in the United Kingdom with Zeebruge in Belgium made it possible for 
the first time to import British gas from the North Sea fields to Germany. In 
the eastern direction, Wingas put into operation in 1999 the JAGAL (German: 
Jamal-Gas-Anbindungsleitung) gas pipeline connecting the Yamal gas pipeline 
running through Poland with the STEGAL gas pipeline in Thuringia. The an-
nual capacity of this connection stands at 24 billion m3. 
The decision to build Nord Stream was a milestone in German-Russian gas 
co-operation. This gas pipeline connecting the two countries has reinforced 
their mutual links and co-dependence. The development of gas pipeline con-
nections with Russia had been planned from the mid 1990s, since it was then 
concluded that it was necessary to develop the transport infrastructure 
due to increasing demand for natural gas. Three variants were considered: 
building a gas pipeline running along the Baltic Sea bed (the most expensive 
variant), developing the connection running through Belarus and Poland 
(Yamal II) and building a gas pipeline running through the Baltic states and 
Poland (Amber). What led to the choice of the most expensive variant by-
passing transit states was Russia’s successful strategy aimed at winning sup-
port for this project, first from the German government and then from the 
European Commission (in 2000, the European Commission granted TEN-E 
status to this gas pipeline)46. The key role in the implementation of this pro-
ject was played by the “unprecedented, strong political support from Gerhard 
Schröder”47, who became the CEO of Nord Stream AG weeks after his term in 
office as chancellor had ended48. 
The construction of the gas pipeline was commenced in 2005 as a Russian-
German project since, along with Gazprom (51% stake), Germany’s E.ON and 
46 K. Pronińska, Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne w stosunkach UE–Rosja, Warsaw 2012, page 313.
47 Ibidem.
48 Employing former prominent German politicians so that they represent Russians in con-
tacts with the West is a strategy frequently used by Russian firms. In 2009, Wolfgang Clem-
ent (SPD), the former minister in North Rhine-Westphalia, was elected member of the su-
pervisory board of the Russian consulting company named Energy Consulting. In 2012, the 
former mayor of Hamburg, Henning Voscherau (SPD), was elected chairman of the supervi-
sory board of South Stream AG; Source: S. Brauns, P. Heller, Die Genossen und das Gas, Zeit 
online, 8 May 2013.
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Wintershall (initially 24.5% each, at present 15.5% each) were engaged in it. 
Holland’s Gasunie joined the project in 2008, and France’s GDF Suez (now 
Engie) in 2010 – the two companies bought shares from the German compa-
nies (9% each). The Nord Stream gas pipeline, including accompanying infra-
structure, was put into operation in 2011–2012. Its annual capacity is 55 billion 
m3. Promptly after Nord Stream – connecting Vyborg in Russia and Greifswald 
in north-eastern Germany – was put into operation, two gas pipelines were 
launched to enable gas transport to Western and Southern Europe. The OPAL 
(German: Ostsee-Pipeline Anbindungsleitung) gas pipeline, with a capacity of 
35 billion m3, linking the entry point of Nord Stream in Greifswald with the 
STEGAL gas pipeline and the Czech system of transport gas pipelines, was put 
into operation in 2011. Then the NEL (German Nordeuropäische Erdgaslei-
tung) gas pipeline was launched in 2012, with an annual capacity of 20 billion 
m3 that connected Greifswald with the gas storage facility in Rehden and the 
MIDAL gas pipeline,. These two gas pipelines are managed by separate compa-
nies owned by WIGA (WIGA Transport Beteiligungs-GmbH & Co. KG), a joint 
venture of Gazprom and Wintershall. Thus, at the turn of the second decade of 
the 21st century, Germany gained a direct link to the Russian gas pipeline net-
work and opened up its way to reach the position of the key country in Russian 
gas transit to the European Union. 
4. german-russian gas relations at present
Four years after the inauguration of the first section of the Nord Stream gas 
pipeline, on 4 September 2015 during the Economic Forum in Vladivostok, 
Gazprom signed an agreement on building two additional branches of Nord 
Stream. Developing Nord Stream is beneficial from the German point of view, 
first of all, because a gas pipeline with an annual capacity of 110 billion m3 (at 
present it is 55 billion m3) will improve the security of gas supplies to Germany 
(for example, in the case of Russia’s conflict with transit countries and result-
ing interruptions in gas supply). The agreement on developing Nord Stream 
was signed despite the economic sanctions imposed by the European Union 
on Russia due to Russian aggression against Ukraine and the annexation of 
Crimea. Along with Gazprom, the agreement was signed by Germany’s BASF 
and E.ON (now Uniper), Austria’s OMV, Dutch-British Shell and France’s Engie 
(former GDF Suez). The preliminary draft agreement provides for building 
a gas pipeline that will run in parallel to the existing connection. The share-
holding structure in New European Pipeline AG, which, like Nord Stream AG, 
was incorporated in Zug, Switzerland, is as follows: Gazprom 51%, BASF, OMV, 
E.ON and Shell 10% each, and Engie 9%. The gas pipeline is expected to be put 
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into operation by the end of 2019 and its construction cost will reach around 
9.9 billion euros49. 
Even though German politicians deny that the decision to develop Nord 
Stream has any political context, giving assurances that this is a purely com-
mercial project, the pipeline’s development will contribute to a strengthening 
of German-Russian relations and will weaken the position of Central Europe-
an countries. Over the past few years, Germany has taken action to enhance 
bilateral co-operation with Russia, especially in the area of the economy. In 
2008, Germany initiated the so-called ‘Partnership for Modernisation’ project, 
which envisaged enhancing economic and political co-operation and provid-
ing German companies with access to the Russian market50. The Partnership 
for Modernisation concept turned out to be a failure. Neither Germany nor 
Russia have achieved the goals linked to it: Germany has been unable to con-
vince Russia to adopt democratic standards in state administration or ensure 
access for German small and medium-sized businesses to the Russian market, 
and Russia has not been given access to the EU market and Western technol-
ogy to the expected extent. The energy and gas sectors are the areas in which 
bilateral co-operation is developing best of all. Berlin’s intention was above all 
to provide German companies with access to oil and gas production and to cre-
ate a market for German energy efficiency and renewable energy source tech-
nologies in Russia. The Russian-German Energy Agency (Russisch-Deutsche 
Energie-Agentur (rudea) was established for this purpose in 2009, but it was 
closed in 2013 – the official reason being the needlessness of maintaining a joint 
institution, and current co-operation was to be continued through direct col-
laboration of the two national energy agencies51. 
In addition to the previously discussed construction of the Nord Stream gas 
pipeline, Germany’s E.ON (renamed Uniper since 1 January 2016) has been in-
vesting in Russian gas fields and the energy sector. At present, the company 
49 Szymon Kardaś, Agata Łoskot-Strachota, Konrad Popławski, Gas business as usual? The 
new agreements between Gazprom and EU energy companies, OSW Analyses, 9 September 
2015, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2015-09-09/gas-business-usual-new-
agreements-between-gazprom-and-eu-energy
50 In 2010, PfM also became a Russia-EU project. See: J. Ćwiek-Karpowicz, R. Formuszewicz, 
„Partnerstwo dla modernizacji” – nowa inicjatywa UE wobec Rosji, BIULETYN PISM No. 44 
(652), 18 March 2010.
51 Press release by the German Energy Agency (dena), dena stellt Kooperation mit Russland 
auf neue Basis, 27 June 2013, http://www.dena.de/presse-medien/pressemitteilungen/dena-
stellt-kooperation-mit-russland-auf-neue-basis.html 
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has a 25% shares minus one share in the Yuzhno-Russkoye gas field (Winter-
shall owns 25% of the shares minus one share, and Gazprom 51%) and owns 
five power plants in Russia, with a total capacity of 9.9 GW (6% of the Rus-
sian power grid capacity)52. At the same time, Gazprom has been increasing 
its presence on the German market. In September 2015, BASF and Gazprom 
carried out an asset swap that had been announced in 2012. BASF’s subsidi-
ary, Wintershall, received a 25% stake in two blocks in the Akhimov deposit 
in the Yuzhno-Russkoye gas field in western Siberia, the estimated deposits 
of which are 274 billion m3 of gas; the production is expected to begin in 2018 
and will reach 8 billion m3 annually. In exchange, Gazprom received the sec-
ond half of the shares in the companies it had so far controlled jointly with 
BASF: Wingas, WIEH (Wintershall Erdgashandelshaus Berlin), WIEE (Win-
tershall Erdgashandelshaus Zug) and in the gas storage facilities in Rehden 
and Jemgum and their operator, Astora. Additionally, Gazprom received 
a 50% stake in the production company Wintershall Nordzee. As a result of 
this transaction, Gazprom gained control of around 6 billion out of 25 billion 
m3 (approximately 25%) of the potential capacity from German gas storage 
facilities. The increase in Gazprom’s share of the German gas market is not 
perceived as a threat to Germany’s energy security, since the German gas 
market is well-developed and in case of disruption, natural gas can be sup-
plied from other directions. 
Close German-Russian relations in the area of energy are becoming increas-
ingly problematic, considering the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the im-
plementation of one of the energy union’s goals by the European Commission, 
i.e. diversification of gas supplies. Berlin has been lobbying, for example, so 
that the European Union in its official stance did not express clear objection 
to the construction of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. When the agreement to 
develop Nord Stream was signed, the project began to be criticised by seven 
Central European countries (including Poland)53 and also by other states con-
cerned about their economic interests, such as Italy, for example54. As a result 
of pressure from countries opposing Nord Stream 2, the German chancellor, 
52 E.ON’s website, http://www.eon.com/de/nachhaltigkeit/regionale-aktivitaeten/russland.
html (accessed on 20 January 2015).
53 Wspólny front przeciwko Nord Stream 2?, Euractiv.pl, 2 December 2015, http://www.euractiv.
pl/energia-srodowisko/wywiad/wspolny-front-przeciwko-nord-stream-2-007664 (accessed 
on 20 January 2015).
54 Italy’s prime minister, Matteo Renzi, spoke against Nord Stream 2 during the European 
Council’s summit on 18–19 December 2015. 
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Angela Merkel, gave assurances during the summit of the European Coun-
cil on 17–18 December 2015 that despite the development of the gas pipeline, 
Ukraine will still play the role of a transit country in gas supplies to Europe55. 
However, such a declaration needs to be viewed as rather unrealistic, because 
Gazprom’s strategy envisages withdrawing from gas transit via Ukraine. On 
the other hand, the German side openly supports the implementation of the 
project in contacts with Russia. During the meeting of the German Minis-
ter for Economic Affairs and Energy, Sigmar Gabriel (SPD), and the Russian 
president Vladimir Putin in Moscow in October 2015, the deputy chancellor 
assured Putin of German support for the project and the desire to enhance 
and improve bilateral relations56. This stance represented by Germany ad-
versely affects relations with those countries for which the development of 
the gas pipeline will have negative effects (Central-Eastern European coun-
tries). Countries in this region are concerned above all that gas can be used 
by Russia as a political weapon, that pricing conditions will worsen and that 
they will lose profits generated so far by gas transit. On the European scale, 
the development of this connection will increase Russia’s share in gas sup-
plies to the EU, which is already high, reaching 40%. 
At present, Russia is the most important supplier of oil and gas to Germany 
(around 33.6% and 34% of imports in 2014)57. Since gas consumption in Germa-
ny will remain stable in the medium term, and Dutch and German gas will no 
longer be present in the energy basket by 2029, Germany’s dependence on Rus-
sian gas imports is likely to increase. It is also worth remembering that, while 
the share of Russian gas in imports to Germany has remained at the same level 
since 1990, the volume of imported gas has increased by almost a half. Ger-
man elites are divided as to the evaluation of the impact of energy dependence 
on Russia. On the one hand, politicians and experts emphasise the need to di-
versify the sources of gas supplies and to develop renewable energy sources 
and investments in energy efficiency in order to become less dependent on 
55 ‚Nord Stream ist privates Projekt – Rechtsgrundlagen klären’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
18 December 2015, http://www.faz.net/agenturmeldungen/unternehmensnachrichten/mer-
kel-nord-stream-ist-privates-projekt-rechtsgrundlagen-klaeren-13973432.html (accessed on 
20 January 2015).
56 Gabriel spielt in Moskau den Gerhard Schröder, Die Welt, 29 October 2015, http://www.welt.
de/politik/ausland/article148156440/Gabriel-spielt-in-Moskau-den-Gerhard-Schroeder.ht-
ml (accessed on 20 January 2015).
57 Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, Zahlen Und Fakten Energiedaten, 16 March 
2015, http://bmwi.de/DE/Themen/Energie/Energiedaten-und analysen/Energiedaten/
gesamtausgabe,did=476134.html
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imports from Russia58. On the other hand, the government supports the de-
velopment of Nord Stream 2 contrary to the European Commission’s official 
stance. A large proportion of German decision-makers and experts support the 
idea of strengthening energy co-operation between the EU and Russia59. Above 
all, Russia is treated as a reliable partner as regards oil and gas supplies, and 
the argument that Russian oil and gas continued to be supplied to Germany 
even when the USSR was falling apart is still raised in the debate. In case of 
a disruption in Russian gas supplies, Germany has a guarantee of gas supply 
security owing to a well-developed infrastructure which enables gas imports 
from other countries. According to calculations of experts from the German 
Institute for Economic Research (DIW), if gas supplies from Russia were cut, 
the price of natural gas in Germany would rise by around 20%, while gas prices 
in other Western European countries, such as the United Kingdom, Holland 
or Belgium, may rise by a similar extent60. Furthermore, energy co-operation 
with Russia is often viewed as a factor contributing to Germany’s security be-
cause it creates co-dependence, offering Berlin an instrument for influencing 
Moscow’s moves. The debate reveals conflicts of interest between representa-
tives of business circles who want to maintain close links with Russia and poli-
ticians who perceive potential threats to the region’s security61. It needs to be 
emphasised that even though energy policy is a very popular topic in the Ger-
man media, public opinion and the media focus above all on such areas as de-
velopment of renewable energy sources and climate policy. Gas imports from 
Russia is a niche issue, reserved for debate among a narrow circle of experts. 
German public opinion does not view Russian gas imports as a major threat to 
energy security, unlike in Central and Eastern Europe. 
58 The government’s response to a parliamentary question of 2 November 2015: response 
18/6526, Geplanter Asset-Tausch zwischen BASF bzw. Wintershall und Gazprom, page 4, 
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/18/065/1806526.pdf (accessed on 20 January 2015).
59 The publication by the German think-tank SWP, whose authors argue for the need to en-
hance EU-Russia relations in the area of energy: A. Gusev, K. Westphal, Russian Energy Pol-
icies Revisited, SWP Research Paper 2015/RP 08, December 2015, page 52, http://www.swp-
berlin.org/en/publications/swp-research-papers/swp-research-paper-detail/article/rus-
sian_energy_policies_revisited.html 
60 Europäische Erdgasversorgung Trotz politischer Krisen sicher, DIW Wochenbericht no. 22, 
2014, pages 490-492, http://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.465398.
de/14-22.pdf 
61 A. Libman, S. Stewart, K. Westphal, Mit Unterschieden umgehen: Die Rolle von Interdepend-
enz in der Beziehung zu Russland in: Ausblick 2016: Begriffe und Realitäten internationaler 
Politik, V. Perthes (ed.), page 20, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/
sonstiges/Ausblick2016.pdf#page=18 
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III. possIble alternatIve sources of supplIes 
1. liquefied natural gas 
At present, Germany imports natural gas solely via pipelines, and its depend-
ence on imports from the two largest suppliers, Russia and Norway, is in-
creasing. Officially, the government supports the European Union’s stance as 
regards the need to diversify gas import routes, but it does not pursue any ac-
tive policy to this effect. In the German government’s opinion, it will only be 
possible to diversify gas import routes in the medium and long term, because 
this requires adequate infrastructure to be built62. Germany is one of those 
few highly-developed countries and the only economy in G-20 not to have an 
LNG terminal. At present, German firms can import liquefied natural gas via 
LNG terminals located abroad. Considering location and inter-system con-
nections, the LNG terminals in Zeebrugge, Belgium and the Gate terminal in 
Rotterdam, Holland are the best adapted to this. Germany can also indirectly 
use the terminals in the United Kingdom (Isle of Grain), Italy (Porto Levante), 
France (Dunkirk) and Poland (Świnoujście). According to an analysis by the 
Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy concerning security of gas 
supplies, the spare regasification capacity of European LNG terminals is suffi-
cient to import additional quantities of natural gas to Germany63. However, the 
authors of this analysis suggest that developing domestic gas storage facilities 
and storing pipeline gas in them is a cheaper solution for ensuring security of 
gas supplies than importing LNG or building a terminal in Germany. 
Plans to build an LNG terminal in Germany date back to the 1970s. DFTG (Ger-
man liquefied natural gas terminal company, German: Deutsche Flüssigerd-
gas Terminal Gesellschaft mbH)64 was established in 1972 and was tasked with 
building an LNG terminal at Wilhelmshaven Port, with an annual capacity 
of around 10.8 billion m3. The terminal has not been built as of yet because 
62 The government’s response to the parliamentary question of 17 April 2014; response 18/1210, 
Position der Bundesregierung zu Energierohstoffimporten aus Russland, page 5.
63 Möglichkeiten zur Verbesserung der Gasversorgungsicherheit und der Krisenvorsorge 
durch Regelungen der Speicher (strategische Reserve, Speicherverpf lichtungen), ein-
schließlich der Kosten sowie der wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen auf den Markt, an analy-
ses ordered by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, Berlin, June 2015, pag-
es 251-254 source: http://bmwi.de/BMWi/Redaktion/PDF/Publikationen/Studien/moegli-
chkeiten-zur-verbesserung-der-gasversorgungsicherheit-und-der-krisenvorsorge-durch-
regelungen-der-speicher,property=pdf,bereich=bmwi2012,sprache=de,rwb=true.pdf
64 http://www.dftg.de/
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it would not be cost-effective according to economic analyses. In 2008, E.ON, 
which holds a 90% stake in DFTG (10% is owned by the German gas company 
VNG) withdrew from this project, and in exchange bought shares in the gas 
port in Rotterdam. At present, E.ON, which is experiencing the worst financial 
problems in its history, is not planning to invest in the LNG terminal in Wil-
helmshaven, even though DFTG has a design and a site for building the termi-
nal. According to analyses from the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and 
Energy, the cost of building the terminal would reach around 800 million eu-
ros, without taking into account the costs of transport infrastructure to send 
gas to the south of the country, which it would be necessary to incur if the pro-
ject was implemented. A new LNG terminal project emerged in 2015. It was de-
veloped by the administration of Brunsbüttel Port and the logistics firm VTG65. 
No details of the investment have been revealed so far. The investors point out 
that the terminal’s operation would be based on bunkering (refueling) ships 
with liquefied natural gas and supplying the gas to the nearby chemical com-
plex, and transporting LNG using specialist railway carriages. 
Even though Germany has no terminal of its own, German companies are ac-
tive on the LNG market. E.ON, which is present in the electricity and gas mar-
kets in most member states of the European Union, has been actively searching 
for LNG supply sources over the past few years. In 2013, the company signed 
a contract with Canada’s Pieridae Energy under which it will buy 6.5 billion 
m3 of natural gas annually for twenty years, starting from 2020. In October 
2013, it signed a contract with Qatargas, a gas supplier from Qatar, envisaging 
supplies of 10 billion m3 of gas in 2014–2019. In February 2015, E.ON signed two 
agreements enabling LNG imports from the USA to Europe starting from 2018. 
The first one concerns transport and liquefaction of gas at Freeport terminal 
in Texas. The second one, signed with the Japanese ship owner, Mitsui O.S.K. 
Lines Ltd., concerns transporting around 800,000 tonnes of LNG (approxi-
mately 1.1 billion m3) annually for twenty years. E.ON holds stakes in terminals 
across Europe, including in the United Kingdom (Isle of Grain), Holland (Gate 
Terminal in Rotterdam), Spain (Barcelona and Huelva) and Italy (OLT in Livor-
no), and the US gas will be sent to these terminals. The company is still consid-
ering such LNG supply directions as: Mozambique, Israel and Peru. During the 
debate on the diversification of gas supplies in 2014, the German government 
declared that it backed German companies’ efforts to diversify the sources of 
65 The official website of Brunsbüttel Port, http://www.brunsbuettel-ports.de/artikel/
schienen-und-hafenlogistiker-setzen-auf-lng.html
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gas imports, including LNG, through political support for signing the contracts 
and their current activity66. 
2. shale gas
Gas production in Germany has been declining since 1999. In 2014 alone, do-
mestic output shrunk by 0.6 billion m3 as compared to the preceding year – to 
10.1 billion m3. In 2014, the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Re-
sources (BGR) estimated that German natural gas reserves were 88.5 billion m3 
(82.6 billion m3 of pure gas)67, which means that conventional gas reserves will 
be depleted by around 202368. In additional to small conventional gas reserves, 
Germany has huge reserves of unconventional gas. German reserves of uncon-
ventional gas in use:
•	 shale gas: 0.7–2.3 trillion m3
•	 coal bed gas: 0.45 trillion m3
•	 tight gas: 90 billion m3 69
Shale gas reserves deserve special attention. According to a report prepared by 
BGR in 2012, German shale gas reserves range between 6.8 and 22.6 trillion m3 
(reserves which cannot be fully extracted for technical reasons, known as GIP, 
Gas-in-Place)70. While coal bed gas and tight gas have been extracted in small 
quantities since the 1950s, shale gas has not been extracted at all. This is caused 
by the very restrictive laws regulating shale gas extraction, disapproval from 
the public and the lack of convenient environmental conditions to enable shale 
gas extraction – Germany is a densely populated country, and shale gas deposits 
are predominantly located in the urbanised north-western part of the country. 
66 The government’s response to a parliamentary question concerning the role played by lique-
fied natural gas in diversifying gas supply sources, source: http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/
btd/18/012/1801299.pdf 
67 Energiestudie 2015, Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources, Hanover 2015, 
page 20.
68 Office for Mining, Energy and Geology of the State of Lower Saxony, Erdöl- und Erdgasre-
serven in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland am 1. Januar 2015, http://www.lbeg.niedersach-
sen.de/portal/live.php?navigation_id=656&article_id=786&_psmand=4 
69 Energiestudie 2015, Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources, Hanover 2015, 
page 21.
70 Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources, Abschätzung des Erdgaspotenzials 
aus dichten Tongesteinen (Schiefergas) in Deutschland, Hanover 2012, http://www.bgr.bund.
de/DE/Themen/Energie/Downloads/BGR_Schiefergaspotenzial_in_Deutschland_2012.
pdf?__blob=publicationFile 
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German public opinion is critical of shale gas extraction. The debate on this 
issue began around 2011 and has been focused on threats to the natural en-
vironment since the very beginning (purity of potable water, pollution with 
chemicals and earthquake risk) rather than on the positive aspects, such as, for 
example, improving energy security. At the same time, hundreds of local ini-
tiatives bringing together local opponents of shale gas exploration and extrac-
tion have emerged. The most important organisations representing shale gas 
opponents are: Bundesverband Bürgerinitiativen Umweltschutz e.V. (BBU) and 
No Moor Fracking. The opponents include the Evangelical Church in Germany 
and the German Brewers’ Federation. Production companies used to make test 
drills until recently, but they have discontinued operation in Germany due to 
protests from local communities and an unfavourable legal environment, as 
was the case for ExxonMobil in 2012. 
The critical approach to shale gas represented by public opinion and non-gov-
ernmental organisations is not shared by national research institutions. It can 
be concluded from the joint opinion presented by the State Geological Surveys 
(SGD) and the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR) 
that it is possible to extract shale gas and at the same time protect the water re-
sources and the natural environment71. In August 2013, three German research 
institutes dealing with geology and protection of the natural environment: 
BGR, GFZ (German Research Centre for Biosciences) and UFZ (Helmholtz Cen-
tre for Environmental Research) issued a statement claiming that shale gas 
can be extracted in Germany, but it is necessary to create a legal framework to 
protect water resources and the natural environment72. 
In 2012, the Christian Democrat-Liberal (CDU/CSU-FDP) coalition government 
commenced work on legislation regulating shale gas extraction in Germany. 
At that time the FDP openly supported the use of these gas resources, while the 
CDU and the CSU were divided. During work on the legislation, the mood against 
shale gas extraction in Germany became overwhelming. The then minister for 
the natural environment, Peter Altmaier (CDU), speculated that a moratorium 
71 Stellungnahme zu den geowissenschaftlichen Aussagen des UBA-Gutachtens, der Studie 
NRW und der Risikostudie des ExxonMobil InfoDialogprozesses zum Thema Fracking, Han-
over, 2013, http://www.bgr.bund.de/DE/Themen/Energie/Downloads/SGD-Stellungnahme-
Fracking-Studien.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2 
72 Hanover-Erklärung zum Kongress Umweltverträgliches Fracking?, June 2013, http://www.
bgr.bund.de/DE/Gemeinsames/Nachrichten/Veranstaltungen/2013/GZH-Veranst/Frack-
ing/Downloads/Hanover-Erklaerung-Finalfassung.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3
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on shale gas extraction could be imposed73, and the Bundesrat passed a resolution 
appealing for adopting the strictest possible standards for shale gas extraction. 
The bill was presented in June 2013 but it was only in April 2015 that the Christian 
Democrat (CDU/CSU) and Social Democrat (SPD) coalition government present-
ed a legislation package regulating shale gas extraction. Since the package was 
submitted to the Bundestag, work on it has stalled in parliament.
The governmental proposal of 1 April 2015 for a legislative package regulat-
ing shale gas extraction in fact equates to a moratorium on its extraction. The 
law imposes a ban on shale gas extraction in areas which contain potable wa-
ter reservoirs and in protected areas. Extraction from layers shallower than 
3000 metres will be prohibited across Germany. Furthermore, federal states 
may ban shale gas extraction in areas where mineral waters are present. It is 
only admissible to make test drills for scientific and research purposes. Fol-
lowing a motion from the economic faction among Christian Democrats (CDU/
CSU), a provision enabling shale gas extraction after 2018 from the wells was 
approved by an independent expert commission. The package contains the fol-
lowing legal acts: 
•	 An act amending regulations of the water law and the natural environ-
ment law; 
•	 An act extending the liability for damages caused by mining to drill mining 
and caverns;
•	 Regulation introducing assessment of the environmental impact of shale 
gas extraction.
The legislation package proposed by the government was criticised by non-
governmental organisations engaged in protecting the natural environment. 
Their criticism concerned both the possibility of water contamination and 
the onus on creating opportunities for extracting new fossil energy sources 
in general instead of focusing on efforts to invest in renewable energy sourc-
es. In turn, economic organisations expressed satisfaction with the fact that 
Germany had not given up on shale gas entirely. Representatives of business 
circles emphasise that the government has proposed the strictest conditions 
for shale gas exploration as compared to other countries and that over 300 hy-
draulic fracturing operations have been carried out in Germany over the past 
50 years without adversely affecting ground waters. According to calculations 
73 Altmaier plant Fracking-Verbot, 17 February 2013, Die Welt, http://www.welt.de/print/wams/
article113687849/Altmaier-plant-Fracking-Verbot.html 
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from the German Industrial Association of Oil and Gas Producers, unless Ger-
many passes a law regulating shale gas extraction, the country will lose pos-
sible investments worth 2 billion euros in the next ten years74. Politicians rep-
resenting those German regions where oil and gas are produced also support 
enabling shale gas extraction75. Regardless of this, it seems unlikely that shale 
gas could be extracted on a large scale in Germany. 
3. gas from renewable energy sources
3.1. Biogas and biomethane
Biogas production is a realistic alternative to natural gas imports. This technol-
ogy has no major opponents among the German public. While Germans categori-
cally oppose shale gas extraction, their support for renewable energy sources, 
including biogas plants, is widespread and ranges, depending on the poll, from 
60% to 85%. Furthermore, biogas is a renewable fuel and has a neutral impact 
on the climate because no additional carbon dioxide is created in the process of 
biomass processing and combustion to the coal cycle. Biogas is generated in the 
process of decomposition of organic waste or energy crops grown specially for 
this purpose – in Germany, this is predominantly maize76. When biogas is puri-
fied to biomethane, its properties become identical to those of natural gas – it 
can be used in industrial processes and as fuel for home furnaces, combustion 
engines and gas power plants. Germany is the European leader in terms of both 
biogas production and research and know-how in this area. 
The production volume of biomethane, which is injected into the gas network, 
is definitely smaller than that of raw biogas, which is combusted directly at 
74 German Industrial Association of Oil and Gas Producers (WEG), Deutsche Erdgasförderer: 
2 Milliarden Euro in 10 Jahren stehen auf dem Spiel, 1 October 2015, http://www.erdoel-erd-
gas.de/Medien/Pressecenter/Presseinformationen/2015/2-Milliarden-Euro-in-10-Jahren-
stehen-auf-dem-Spiel 
75 The mayor of Celle, Dirk-Ulrich Mende (SPD), Germany will lose its future without hydrau-
lic fracturing (Ohne Fracking verspielt Deutschland seine Zukunft), Die Zeit, 6 November 
2015, http://www.zeit.de/wirtschaft/unternehmen/2015-11/fracking-deutschland-erdoel-
dirk-ulrich-mende/komplettansicht 
76 In 2014, 53% of substrate (primary material) at German biogas plants originated from ener-
gy crops, 43% from manure, 3% from municipal waste and 2% from industrial and agricul-
tural production waste. Maize accounts for 73%, haylage for 12% and corn for 7% of energy 
crops. Source: Fachagenutr Nachwachsende Rohostoffe e.V. (Agency for Renewable Resourc-
es), https://mediathek.fnr.de/massebezogener-substrateinsatz-nachwachsender-rohstoffe-
in-biogasanlagen.html 
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biogas plants to produce electricity or heat. 178 installations injecting biometh-
ane into the gas network were in operation in 2014. With an annual output of 
9 TWh, biomethane satisfied around 1% of Germany’s demand for natural gas. 
What impedes widespread use of this technology is the gas price – imported 
natural gas is in most cases cheaper than biomethane. Initial plans concern-
ing development of biogas plants were very ambitious. In 2007, the Integrated 
Energy and Climate Programme (IEKP) strategy set the goal of increasing bi-
omethane production to 6 billion m3 by 2020 and to 10 billion m3 by 2030. Biogas 
production has been supported with legal regulations: the Act on Renewable 
Energy Sources financed the production of electricity and heat from biogas 
plants, and the Biofuels Act supported biomethane production for transport 
purposes. A regulation supporting production of biomethane and its introduc-
tion into the network was adopted in 2008. 
Chart 13. Biomethane production in Germany in 2006–2015
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015*
0
200
400
600
800
1000
number of facilities
annual production 
production capacity
* preliminary data
[millions m3]
2 8 11
38
93
158 179
269 275
449
413
580
520
665 688
820
780
850
105
186179
144
108
77
443013
source: Erneuerbare Energien und das EEG: Zahlen, Fakten, Grafiken (2015), BDEW, Berlin 2015, page 13
Earlier forecasts concerning development of the sector turned out to be overly 
optimistic. In 2014, the government withdrew from the goal of increasing bi-
omethane production to 10 billion m3 annually by 2030. Around 0.63 billion m3 
of biomethane was introduced to the gas network in 2014. Given the high costs 
and negative environmental impact of biofuel cultivation, the government 
has also scaled back the plans concerning electricity production by biogas 
plants. Biogas plants producing raw biogas for power plants in 2014 generated 
32.6 TWh of electric energy, i.e. around 5.5% of total consumption.
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Biogas power plants, like other RES, are given preferential treatment on the 
market in Germany. In 2014, the government decided to cut the guaranteed en-
ergy purchase tariff for this technology. At present, 8928 biogas power plants 
operate in Germany: the largest number in Bavaria (2360) and Lower Saxony 
(1562). While in the period 2004–2013 the installed capacity of biogas power 
plants increased from 390 MW to 3637 MW, the growth rate was significantly 
lower in the subsequent years. Biogas power plants with a capacity of 268 MW 
were built in 2014, while the forecast for 2015 is 202 new installations with 
a capacity of 272 MW. This growth rate is low, especially if we compare the in-
crease in capacity of photovoltaic and wind power plants in 2014, respectively: 
1899 MW and 4750 MW. In 2014, biogas was used to produce around 14 TWh of 
thermal energy and 0.55 TWh of energy for cars fuelled by gas. In total, biogas 
satisfied around 5% of Germany’s demand for electricity (natural gas 9.7%) and 
3% of primary energy consumption (natural gas 20.4%) in 201477. Even though 
expectations concerning the development of biomethane sector have been 
tempered, the German government still declares its intention to develop this 
sector. 
3.2. Power-to-gas or gas from renewable energy sources
Gas production from electricity originating from RES is a necessary element 
of the German energy transformation. This technology is known in Germany 
as power-to-gas. Transforming power surpluses from solar and wind power 
plants into hydrogen or methane is a way of storing energy. Stored hydrogen 
or methane can be used as a fuel in the heating and transport sectors. Gas from 
RES is generated through electrolysis of water. This process generates hydro-
gen (H2). Hydrogen can be directly injected to the gas network (the admissible 
hydrogen concentration limit is 5%), used as a raw material in the chemical in-
dustry or as a fuel, for example, for car engines (at present, 29 hydrogen filling 
stations operate in Germany, including 17 available to all road users78). Reac-
tion with carbon dioxide, so-called methanisation, enables the production of 
synthetic methane (syngas), i.e. gas which has identical properties to natural 
gas. In around 30 years, power-to-gas may be a means of managing electricity 
77 Data quoted from the Biogas Association (Fachverband Biogas e.V.), http://www.biogas.org/
edcom/webfvb.nsf/id/DE_Branchenzahlen/$file/15-11-19_Biogas%20Branchenzahlen-2014_
Prognose-2015_final.pdf
78 In 2014, 29 hydrogen filling stations operated in Germany, 82 in Europe as a whole, 63 in 
North America and 38 in Asia. Source: http://www.tuev-sued.de/tuev-sued-konzern/presse/
pressearchiv/weltweit-17-neue-wasserstoff-tankstellen-im-jahr-2014
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production in a system based on renewable wind and solar energy – in the pe-
riods of low sun exposure and during windless weather it will be possible to 
generate electricity through the combustion of previously stored gas from RES. 
The power-to-gas technology has not reached the research and development 
phase – at present, fourteen pilot installations operate in Germany, and six 
more are under construction. Even though electrolysis of water has been 
known since the early 19th century, it is still an excessively expensive energy 
storage method. According to information from the Federal Ministry for Eco-
nomic Affairs and Energy, power-to-gas may be a decisive factor in the con-
struction of a zero-emission energy system in the medium term. However, at 
present, the government is concentrating on supporting research and build-
ing demo installations79. According to research conducted by the German Re-
newable Energies Agency (Agentur für Erneuerbare Energien e.V.), power-to-gas 
technology will have to be applied in managing electricity production when 
the share of RES in total electricity output reaches 60%-80%, i.e. around 2040 
(in 2015, the share of RES in electricity production stood at 30%). Before this, 
pumped-storage power plants and battery-based energy storage facilities will 
be used to adjust output fluctuations80. Forecasts concerning the future devel-
opment of power-to-gas differ radically. The most optimistic scenarios suggest 
that the installed capacity of power-to-gas installations will reach between 
50 and 90 GW by 2050, while the pessimistic ones range between 10 and 20 GW81 
(for comparison, in 2015, the installed capacity of German power plants was 
199.2 GW, where RES accounted for 93.9 GW)82. This discrepancy results from 
the differences in assumptions made – if the European energy market develops 
and transmission networks are expanded, energy storage on such a large scale 
will be unnecessary, since electricity can be traded and thus output surpluses 
and shortages can be adjusted, otherwise large-scale storage will be necessary. 
Another noteworthy fact is that the German industry supports the idea of 
developing hydrogen-powered cars. In 2015, six leading companies from the 
79 Information from the website of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, 
http://bmwi.de/DE/Themen/Energie/Konventionelle-Energietraeger/gas,did=540466.html
80 Renewable Energies Agency, Netzausbau und internationaler Stromaustausch verringern 
Speicherbedarf, 16 January 2015, source: http://www.unendlich-viel-energie.de/netzaus-
bau-und-internationaler-stromaustausch-verringern-speicherbedarf
81 Ibidem.
82 Federal Network Agency, https://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/cln_1411/DE/Sachgebiete/Ele-
ktrizitaetundGas/Unternehmen_Institutionen/Versorgungssicherheit/Erzeugungskapazi-
taeten/Kraftwerksliste/kraftwerksliste-node.html
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fuel and automotive industries established a company named H2 Mobility 
Deutschland tasked with building by 2023 a network of around 400 hydrogen 
filling stations in Germany. Its shareholders are Germany’s Daimler and Linde, 
Austria’s OMV, Dutch-British Shell and France’s Total and Air Liquide. BMW 
and Volkswagen co-operate with H2 Mobility. The companies have become en-
gaged in the project because they believe that the future solutions for alterna-
tive fuel vehicles are not limited to electric or hybrid cars, but that there is also 
a place for hydrogen-powered vehicles. The construction of 400 filling stations 
will cost around 400 million euros83. At the same time, the federal government 
has increased funding for research and development of the hydrogen technol-
ogy – in 2015, the government allocated 161 million euros to the research pro-
gramme for the development of hydrogen and fuel cell technologies. This deci-
sion might have been a result of lobbying from German car manufacturers, the 
prices of whose electric cars are far from competitive. The German government 
announced back in 2007 that one million electric cars would be registered in 
Germany by 2020. Although each subsequent cabinet has declared their inten-
tion to achieve this goal, this is already impossible – only 24000 electric cars 
and only around 100 hydrogen-powered cars were registered in Germany up 
until May 2015. In April 2015, the government agreed to support the automo-
tive industry as regards the sale of electric cars. The sum of 300 million euros 
is to be allocated to building car charging stations, and 600 million euros to 
subsidies to promote the buying of electric cars. Between 300,000 and 400,000 
electric cars are expected to be on the roads in Germany by 2019 thanks to this 
move84. 
rafał bajczuk
83 Official website of H2 Mobility Deutschland, http://h2-mobility.de/wp-content/uploads / 
2015/10/Wasserstoff-tanken-in-Deutschland-zuk%C3%BCnftig-f l%C3%A4chendeckend-
m%C3%B6glich_13.10.2015.pdf
84 Konrad Popławski, Niemcy: rząd wprowadzi dotacje dla samochodów elektrycznych, OSW 
Analyses, 11 May 2016, http://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2016-05-11/niemcy-
rzad-wprowadzi-dotacje-dla-samochodow-elektrycznych 
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appendIX: 
Map 1. The German natural gas transmission system
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Table 1. Natural gas imports to Germany in 1960–2014 in TJ 
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1960  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1961 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1962 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1963 0 0 0 0 0 0 109 109
1964 0 0 0 0 0 0 373 373
1965 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 256 1 256
1966 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 642 1 642
1967 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 010 12 010
1968 0 0 0 0 0 0 54 095 54 095
1969 0 0 0 0 0 0 93 744 93 744
1970 0 0 135 472 0 0 0 0 135 472
1971 0 0 224 940 0 0 0 0 224 940
1972 0 0 354 362 0 0 0 0 354 362
1973 0 0 546 913 0 0 29 860 0 576 773
1974 0 0 779 666 0 0 110 258 0 889 924
1975 0 0 945 945 0 0 128 202 0 1 074 147
1976 0 0 1 014 244 0 0 126 554 0 1 140 798
1977 0 0 884 053 29 438 0 135 113 200 349 1 248 953
1978 0 0 714 314 252 908 0 390 297 0 1 357 519
1979 0 0 816 802 304 590 0 465 741 0 1 587 133
1980 0 0 793 453 358 855 0 583 688 0 1 735 996
1981 0 0 649 364 369 075 0 606 283 0 1 624 722
1982 0 0 614 183 298 975 0 531 677 69 191 1 514 026
1983 0 0 627 492 277 744 0 510 855 102 870 1 518 961
1984 0 0 562 530 280 825 0 699 404 1 863 1 544 622
1985 0 0 680 275 248 294 0 699 193 14 211 1 641 973
1986 15 730 0 584 544 258 920 0 823 496 11 175 1 693 865
1987 18 229 0 627 326 303 731 0 898 025 0 1 847 311
1988 18 146 0 551 522 322 488 0 907 229 0 1 799 385
1989 16 670 0 630 253 346 168 0 969 641 0 1 962 732
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1990 16 245 0 652 396 336 170 0 981 006 0 1 985 817
1991 29 486 0 789 635 340 911 0 899 264 4 361 2 063 657
1992 31 318
23 
999
834 641 387 390 0 838 330 121 2 115 799
1993 31 282 6 048 883 342 393 148 5 163 945 645 615 2 265 243
1994 34 314 4 032 793 608 424 842 22 875 1 095 350 940 2 375 961
1995
 34 
800
516 840 951 469 546
21 
646
1 205 187 1 197 2 573 843
1996 44 577 2 634 996 760 632 264
18 
660
1 218 947 8 955 2 922 797
1997 95 421 0 831 931 754 943 13 261 1 151 339 1 494 2 848 389
1998 80 603 0 749 117 712 951
12 
842
1 190 980 1 557 2 748 050
1999* 0 0 704 733 720 273 0 1 290 507 149 721 2 865 234
2000* 0 0 628 513 757 969 0 1 299 906 155 309 2 841 697
2001* 0 0 703 016 831 264 0 1 235 431 181 712 2 951 423
2002* 0 0 683 059 964 662 0 1 249 659 166 329 3 063 709
2003* 0 0 644 370 987 800 0 1 398 271 156 887 3 187 328
2004* 0 0 748 779 1 038 277 0 1 466 679 136 122 3 389 857
2005* 0 0 735 193 1 097 831 0 1 425 938 161 701 3 420 663
2006* 0 0 824 753 1 069 246 0 1 475 505 149 637 3 519 141
2007* 0 0 737 589 1 040 911 0 1 436 060 109 134 3 323 694
2008* 0 0 665 071 1 137 048 0 1 527 566 150 786 3 480 471
2009* 0 0 726 248 1 299 062 0 1 343 539 182 429 3 551 278
2010* 0 0 803 226 1 307 119 0 1 463 304 157 499 3 731 148
2011* 0 0 802 514 1 246 754 0 1 422 373 165 861 3 637 502
2012* 0 0 826 450 1 287 263 0 1 413 482 117 602 3 644 797
2013* 0 0 978 637 1 099 523 0 1 448 087 218 503 3 744 750
2014* 0 0 867 522 1 194 227 0 1 391 163 151 655 3 604 567
*Imports from Denmark and the United Kingdom are specified in the table as “other countries” 
source: Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (BAFA), Entwicklung der Erdgaseinfuhr in 
die Bundesrepublik Deutschland Bilanzen 1998–2014 Grafik, http://www.bafa.de/bafa/de/energie/erdgas/
ausgewaehlte_statistiken/egashist.pdf
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Table 2. Gas consumption by domestic recipients in 2004–2014 in Germany 
(final energy consumption in PJ) 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
total final 
consumption in 
germany
2 216.7 2 098.6 2 189.1 2 103.7 2 176.9 2 034.0 2 247.3 2 038.2 2 122.7 2 184.3 1 926.5
trade & services 377.8 368.6 461.2 393.2 416.7 392.8 425.4 390.4 363.7 411.1 372.6
households 1 017.5 985.0 959.6 893.5 940.5 928.3 1 016.6 845.3 916.5 966.0 786.2
transport 0.0 3.1 4.4 5.8 7.1 8.4 8.8 8.8 8.9 7.4 7.5
Industry 821.4 741.9 763.9 811.1 812.5 704.4 796.6 793.7 792.4 799.8 760.3
 including:
Aggregate mining 54.8 31.8 56.2 56.0 52.2 44.0 47.6 47.7 47.0 47.5 46.5
Food and tobacco 
production
99.2 98.3 94.5 98.9 96.7 96.0 105.4 107.8 109.6 112.1 104.9
Paper industry 65.0 83.6 75.9 94.1 86.5 78.5 86.7 80.1 78.2 79.5 74.4
Chemical industry 207.6 169.4 166.4 187.8 202.1 182.3 203.6 208.9 216.7 216.8 200.5
Rubber and plastics 
industry
20.8 20.1 21.5 20.0 20.5 17.8 20.6 20.1 20.0 21.2 20.1
Glass and ceramics 64.0 59.7 51.3 55.5 61.2 56.5 60.5 61.1 60.1 61.6 60.1
Metallurgical 
industry
92.8 68.8 84.7 90.0 92.5 56.6 77.8 78.2 70.9 64.0 61.6
Non-ferrous metals 39.5 36.2 40.4 38.6 38.4 32.9 38.7 37.5 37.0 36.6 36.0
Machinery 
construction
29.2 29.2 29.8 29.4 26.8 22.6 25.4 22.7 24.5 25.0 23.9
Vehicle 
construction
43.7 42.7 38.5 39.1 37.8 31.6 37.8 37.1 36.1 39.8 38.7
source: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, Zahlen Und Fakten Energiedaten, 1 October 
2015, http://bmwi.de/DE/Themen/Energie/Energiedaten-und analysen/Energiedaten/gesamtausgabe-
,did=476134.html 
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Chart 1. Primary energy consumption in Germany in 2014 
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Chart 2. Final energy consumption in Germany in 2014
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source: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, Zahlen Und Fakten Energiedaten, 1 October 
2015, http://bmwi.de/DE/Themen/Energie/Energiedaten-und analysen/Energiedaten/gesamtausgabe-
,did=476134.html 
